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Tariq Aziz (, , 28 April 1936 – 5 June 2015) was an Iraq politician who served as the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq from 1979 to 2003 and Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1983 to 1991. He was a close advisor of President Saddam Hussein. Additionally, Aziz was a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and the Regional Command of the Iraqi Branch of the Ba'ath Party. Ethnically Assyrian, he was both an Arab nationalism and a Chaldean Catholic.
His association with Saddam began in the 1950s when both were Activism for the then-banned Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. Due to security concerns, Saddam rarely left Iraq, so Aziz would often be Iraq's highest-level representative at international and diplomatic summits. In the year prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Aziz said that the United States did not want "regime change" in Iraq but rather "region change". He said that the Bush administration's reasons for war were "oil and Israel." After surrendering to American forces on 24 April 2003, Aziz was held in prison, first by American forces and subsequently by the new Iraqi government, in Camp Cropper in western Baghdad. He was acquitted at trial of some charges but was later found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced to 15 years in 2009 for the executions of 42 merchants found guilty of profiteering in 1992 and another 7 years for relocating Kurds.
On 26 October 2010, he was sentenced to Death penalty by the Iraqi High Tribunal, which sparked international condemnation from Iraqi bishops, other Iraqis, the Holy See, the United Nations, the European Union and the human rights organization Amnesty International, as well as various governments around the world, such as Russia. On 28 October 2010, it was reported that Aziz, as well as 25 fellow prison inmates, had begun a hunger strike to protest the fact that they could not receive their once-monthly visit from friends and relatives, which was normally set for the last Friday of each month. Iraqi President Jalal Talabani declared that he would not sign Aziz's execution order, thus commuting his sentence to indefinite imprisonment. Aziz remained in custody for the rest of his life and died of a heart attack in the city of Nasiriyah on 5 June 2015, aged 79 and is buried in Jordan. Iraq president refuses to sign execution order for Tariq Aziz Daily Telegraph, 17 November 2010
One of the most prominent figures during the Ba'athist era of Iraq, he was the sole Christian to hold a high position in Saddam's government. Aziz's trademark such as cigars and his glasses and mustache have drawn comparisons with the American movie star, Groucho Marx.
He studied English at the University of Baghdad and later worked as a journalist, before joining the Ba'ath Party in 1957. During the 1950s, when Iraq was under the monarchical rule, Aziz along with other Ba'athists opposed the government. During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States showed limited interest in the Arab Socialist Party, which later became the Ba'ath Party, and its rise to power in Iraq. In this period, the U.S. was primarily concerned with the spread of Soviet communism around the world, particularly in the Middle East, rather than focusing on the internal politics of Arab countries.
The Ba'ath Party first came to power in 1963 following the Iraq Revolution of 1958, a time when Tariq Aziz was serving as the editor-in-chief of the party's newspaper. Despite this significant political shift in Iraq, Aziz remarked that American diplomatic engagement with the country remained minimal. During the presidency of John F. Kennedy and later Lyndon B. Johnson, there was little meaningful interaction between Iraq and the U.S. government, with very few American journalists visiting Iraq compared to journalists from Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. In 1963, he was editor of the newspaper Al-Jamahir and Al-Thawra, the main newspapers of the Ba'ath party.Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, 1978).
Following the coup against the Ba'ath Party regime in 1963, Aziz was imprisoned in Syria for over a year and did not have direct access to firsthand information during that time. However, he recalled that rumors circulated within the Iraqi government about CIA involvement in political and business circles in Iraq. While the involvement of CIA agents in Iraq was never conclusively proven at the time, Aziz later suggested that some of these agents may have had connections with Americans, and the presence of such figures was seen as suspicious by the Ba'ath Party leadership. However, Aziz emphasized that despite these rumors, the U.S. did not appear to take any direct or aggressive action in Iraq at that time, and Iraq did not view the CIA’s involvement as part of a larger, more significant American intervention in the country.
In the 1970s, the U.S. government, particularly under Henry Kissinger during the Nixon administration, expressed concerns about Iraq’s alliance with the Soviet Union, including unfounded claims about a Soviet military base in Iraq. These claims were refuted after Aziz facilitated a meeting between U.S. journalists and Vice President Saddam Hussein, who challenged the allegations. Despite these tensions, the diplomatic relationship remained limited, and the U.S. continued to view Iraq through the lens of its broader Cold War strategy rather than as a major Middle Eastern partner.
By the time Saddam Hussein became Vice President in the early 1970s, Iraq had taken bold steps to nationalize its oil industry, a move that was met with resistance from Western countries, including the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands. However, France, under President Georges Pompidou, was more supportive, signaling a key shift in Iraq’s foreign policy. Iraq’s relations with France, and Europe more broadly, grew stronger during this period, as these nations took a more neutral stance on Iraq’s oil nationalization and the broader Middle Eastern political situation. Aziz also reflected on the 1970s as a time when Iraq’s main focus was on its economic development, with both Saddam Hussein and other key leaders like Aziz prioritizing the modernization of Iraq's industry, infrastructure, and education systems. Despite the challenges posed by the Iran-Iraq War, this vision of a highly developed, self-sufficient Iraq remained central to the Ba'ath Party’s goals.
In the late 1970s, during the Carter administration, there were persistent U.S. concerns regarding Iraq's potential alignment with the Soviet Union. Aziz recalled how the United States floated claims about Iraq being a pro-Soviet regime, specifically suggesting that Iraq hosted a Soviet airbase or naval base. To address these allegations, Aziz invited two prominent journalists from Time magazine to meet with then Vice President Saddam Hussein. Aziz mentioned to the journalists that they had information about a possible Soviet base in Iraq. In response, Saddam told the journalists to look for themselves to verify whether the claims were true. After their visit, the journalists found no evidence of any such Soviet installations, reaffirming that these claims were baseless.
During this period, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iraq were strained. In the aftermath of the 1967 Israeli-Arab war, many countries in the region, including Iraq and Egypt, severed their diplomatic ties with the United States. Iraq’s diplomatic presence in Washington was minimal; rather than an official embassy, Iraq had an interest section—a practice that left Iraq's representation in the U.S. largely dormant. Aziz, at the time serving as the Minister of Information, emphasized that Iraq did not feel any significant American influence or concern during this period.
Under the leadership of Henry Kissinger as U.S. Secretary of State, there was growing discontent throughout the Middle East with U.S. foreign policy, especially due to U.S. support for Israeli aggression. Aziz noted that, during this period, the entire region, including Iraq, was increasingly leaning toward anti-American sentiment. As a result, Iraq's foreign relations were focused more on Europe and the Soviet Union, with these countries becoming increasingly important partners for Iraq during this time.
After the incident, Saddam Hussein arrived at Al-Mustansiriya University and delivered a speech to the students, during which he said, "We are dancing on the shoulders of death." At the time, the Iraqi government claimed that Iran backed the attack, and Saddam’s government immediately accused the Dawa Party of orchestrating the attempt. It was an Iranian-backed assassination attempt. The attack killed several people. This incident formed part of the casus belli of the Iran–Iraq War.
In 1979, during the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Havana, a decision was made that the next summit in 1982 would be held in Iraq. On the way back from Havana, President Hussein expressed his concerns to Aziz, stating, "We have very good relations with the Soviet Union, but we also need to appear non-aligned and engage with the superpowers, including the United States." Although Aziz was not yet the Foreign Minister, as Deputy Prime Minister, he served as a key advisor on foreign policy matters and was entrusted with sensitive diplomatic responsibilities. The President tasked him with preparing for the resumption of diplomatic ties with the United States, while avoiding any haste, understanding that careful timing was crucial.
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 complicated these plans. Initially, Aziz and the Iraqi leadership decided against pursuing any immediate contact with the U.S., fearing it would be misinterpreted as aligning with America against Iran. Instead, they focused on maintaining Iraq’s independence and military capacity. By 1982, after two years of war and as the political landscape shifted, Iraq began cautiously exploring the prospect of resuming ties with the U.S.
That year, the head of the American Interest Section in Baghdad requested an increase in the level of diplomatic contacts. Previously, communication between the U.S. and Iraq had been handled through the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but after the request, President Hussein authorized direct meetings between Aziz and U.S. diplomats. During this period, Aziz engaged in numerous discussions with American diplomats and congressional staff visiting Baghdad on fact-finding missions. This dialogue helped both sides better understand each other's positions on key issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and the war with Iran.
Aziz’s diplomatic efforts laid the groundwork for the eventual restoration of U.S.-Iraq relations in 1984, which was a significant shift in Iraq's foreign policy after years of tension with the United States.
India, which had good relations with both India and Iraq, maintained neutrality in the conflict and urged both sides to cease hostilities. The 7th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement was to be held in New Delhi in 1983. On 9 February 1982, Aziz traveled to India, met the Indian Minister of External Affairs, P.V. Narasimha Rao and held talks regarding Iran's presence at the summit. Aziz said that he hopes Iran will attend the conference. The two countries have been at war for more than a year.
Aziz acknowledged that Iraq used chemical weapons in the war, but insisted that Iran was the first to use them.
He told reporters at the airport that Iraq sought an end to the 16-month war, along their border. Aziz was part of the Iraqi delegation led by Saddam. However, tight security was maintained, due to an assassination plan by the Islamic Dawa Party. Later, Aziz attended several Non-Aligned Movement summits, representing Iraq. Aziz negotiated with France to buy fighter planes and established an economic alliance with the former Soviet Union. In 1988 he traveled to Geneva, Switzerland, to negotiate a treaty to end the Iran-Iraq War.
As tensions escalated following the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, attention turned to Cairo after Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak called for an emergency summit on August 8 to discuss the crisis. The meeting was seen as a crucial moment in the unfolding Gulf crisis, as regional and international pressure mounted against Iraq. According to journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, Mubarak made diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the situation. On the morning of August 9, Mubarak summoned Iraqi Ambassador to Egypt Nabil Najm and asked him to deliver a verbal message to Saddam, advising that if Iraq could not attend the summit, it should at least send a high-level delegation willing to adopt a flexible approach. Later that day, Baghdad announced that a top-level Iraqi delegation was en route to Cairo. That evening, an Iraqi aircraft landed at Cairo Airport, carrying a delegation led by Taha Yassin Ramadan including Aziz.
Upon arrival, tensions arose immediately. Unlike other delegations, the Iraqi representatives were housed in a government guest palace rather than a hotel, which led Tariq Aziz to question the decision. He reportedly asked, “Why are we placed in a guest palace while all other delegations are in hotels?” Egyptian officials responded that the Iraqi delegation faced unique security concerns. Aziz remained skeptical, stating, “Is this for our protection or to isolate us? If it is for our protection, we can take responsibility for ourselves. We trust the Egyptian people.” An Egyptian official responded, “The issue is not with the Egyptian people, but with the tens of thousands of Kuwaitis now in Cairo.”
Further tensions arose when only Taha Yassin was invited to meet President Mubarak on the evening of August 9, excluding Aziz. Aziz objected, arguing that the delegation had arrived as a unified body and that he himself had a personal friendship with Mubarak. Despite his objections, the meeting proceeded as planned, with Ramadan attending alone. During their discussions, according to Heikal, Mubarak and Ramadan exchanged firm positions. Mubarak later claimed that Ramadan had insisted Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait was “final and irreversible” and could not be subjected to Arab discussion. Meanwhile, Ramadan recounted that he had expressed Iraq’s belief that certain Arab states had already aligned irreversibly with the U.S., though Iraq still had confidence in Mubarak’s leadership.
The delegation arrived in Cairo already suspicious of U.S. military movements in the region. The visit of U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to Jeddah, accompanied by General Norman Schwarzkopf, had raised alarms in Baghdad. The announcement that the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower was approaching the Suez Canal further heightened Iraqi fears that military action was imminent. According to Heikal, the summit seemed more like a public relations event than a decisive diplomatic initiative, reflecting the broader disarray within the Arab world at the time. The summit itself was chaotic. The Arab League General Secretariat, responsible for organizing the event, barely arrived in time, with Secretary-General Chedli Klibi and his aides landing in Cairo at the last minute. No official agenda had been prepared, adding to the confusion. The disorder that followed would ultimately mark a turning point in Iraq’s diplomatic isolation in the lead-up to the Gulf War. Since then Saddam stopped making foreign visits and mostly sent either Aziz or Ramadan.
In March 1992, Aziz attended a formal Security Council meeting in New York and presented evidence to support his claim that Iraq had fully complied with the disarmament terms of Resolution 687. He suggested that the UN sanctions be reduced, arguing that Iraq had completed its obligations. However, despite presenting facts and figures showing the disarmament efforts, the UN Security Council refused to ease the sanctions. Aziz noted that instead of acknowledging Iraq’s compliance, the UNSCOM continued to make allegations about Iraq hiding weapons, even though no such weapons were found.
Aziz also criticized the leadership of UNSCOM, claiming that many of the inspectors, particularly those from the U.S. and U.K., were not neutral professionals but were instead politically motivated to maintain the sanctions and conduct espionage. He believed that UNSCOM’s mission had evolved into a political tool rather than a purely disarmament-focused effort. Throughout this period, Aziz maintained that the imposition of sanctions was unjust and that the work of UNSCOM, while initially aimed at disarming Iraq, was increasingly used to spy on Iraq and provide a pretext for continuing the sanctions regime. Despite Iraq’s compliance, Aziz felt that the UNSCOM operation had been hijacked by political interests, particularly from the U.S. and U.K., to serve broader geopolitical agendas rather than the actual goal of disarmament.
In April 2002, Aziz warned Russia that its economic interests with Iraq would be harmed if it agreed to the implementation of so-called "smart sanctions." This warning played a role in Russia blocking a United Nations Security Council resolution that would have authorized their application. In October 2002, during a visit to Ankara, he declared that Iraq would no longer consider Turkey a friendly state if it allowed its bases to be used by the United States in the event of an attack on Iraq. This statement contributed to the Turkish Parliament’s decision in early March 2003 to reject a U.S. request on the matter.
On 14 February 2003, Aziz reportedly had an audience with Pope John Paul II and other officials in Vatican City, where, according to a Holy See statement, he communicated "the wish of the Iraqi government to co-operate with the international community, notably on disarmament". The same statement said that the Pope "insisted on the necessity for Iraq to faithfully respect and give concrete commitments to resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, which is the guarantor of international law".
Before the war, Aziz claimed he would rather die than be a U.S. prisoner of war: "Do you expect me, after all my history as a militant and as one of the Iraqi leaders, to go to an American prison – to go to Guantanamo? I would rather die", he told Britain's ITV.
Before the war, Aziz claimed he would rather die than be a U.S. prisoner of war: "Do you expect me, after all my history as a militant and as one of the Iraqi leaders, to go to an American prison – to go to Guantanamo? I would rather die", he told Britain's ITV. On 24 May 2006, Aziz testified in Baghdad as a defence witness for Ibrahim Barzan and Mukhabarat employees, claiming that they did not have any role in the 1982 Dujail Massacre. He stated that the arrests were in response to the assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein, which was carried out by the Shiite Dawa Party. "If the head of state comes under attack, the state is required by law to take action. If the suspects are caught with weapons, it's only natural they should be arrested and put on trial".
He further testified that the Dujail attack was "part of a series of attacks and assassination attempts by this group, including against me." He said that in 1980, Dawa Party insurgents threw a grenade at him as he visited a Baghdad university, killing civilians around him. "I'm a victim of a criminal act conducted by this party, which is in power right now. So put it on trial. Its leader was the prime minister and his deputy is the prime minister right now and they killed innocent Iraqis in 1980," he said. The Dawa Party is now a party in the Shiite coalition that dominates the Iraqi government. The party's leader, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, was prime minister until mid-May, when another leading Dawa Party figure, Nouri al-Maliki, was picked and he was able to form a new government before the end of May 2006. In his closing remarks, he stated that "Saddam is my colleague and comrade for decades, and Barzan is my brother and my friend and he is not responsible for Dujail's events."
In August 2005, Aziz's family was allowed to visit him. At the time the location of Aziz's prison was undisclosed; his family was transported in a bus with blackened out windows. For security reasons he was later moved to Camp Cropper, part of the huge U.S base surrounding Baghdad airport. His son said that while his father was in poor health, he was being well treated by prison officials. He could make 30 minutes of telephone calls monthly and had access to US Arabic-language radio and television stations. Every two months his family could send a parcel containing clothes, cigarettes, chocolate, coffee and magazines.
The spiritual leader of Iraq's Chaldean Catholic community, Emmanuel III Delly, called for Aziz's release in his 2007 Christmas message. Aziz was acquitted of crimes against humanity. On 17 January 2010, Aziz suffered a stroke and was transferred from prison to hospital. On 5 August 2010, The Guardian released his first face-to-face interview since his surrender. On 22 September 2010, documents were released that he had given an interview about how he had told the FBI that President Hussein was "delighted" in the 1998 terrorist bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa but had no interest in partnering with Osama bin Laden.
On 26 October 2010, the Iraqi High Tribunal handed down a death sentence against Aziz for the offense of "persecution of Islamic parties," amongst them the serving Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Islamic Dawa Party, following a crackdown on a Shia uprising after the 1991 Gulf War. The Associated Press reports that "the judge gave no details of Aziz's specific role" in the crackdown. His lawyer stated that Aziz's role in the former Iraqi government was in the arena of "Iraq's diplomatic and political relations only, and had nothing to do with the executions and purges carried during Hussein's reign." His lawyer further stated that the death sentence itself was politically motivated and that timing of the death sentence may have been aimed at diverting international attention away from the Iraq War documents leak, which detailed crimes in which Maliki government officials have been implicated. His lawyers had 30 days to lodge an appeal, following which the court would have another 30 days to look into the appeal; if the appeal is turned down the sentence would be carried out after another 30 days.
On 26 October 2010 the Holy See urged the Iraqi government not to carry out his execution, and European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton stated that Aziz's execution would be "unacceptable and the EU will seek to commute his sentence." That same day, the human rights organization Amnesty International issued a statement condemning the use of the death penalty in this case, as well as for the cases of two other former Iraqi officials; the statement also expressed concern regarding the manner in which trials may have been conducted by the Iraqi High Tribunal. On 27 October 2010, Greek President Karolos Papoulias and the Russian Foreign Ministry both released statements urging the Iraqi government not to carry out the death penalty against Aziz. Also on 27 October 2010, a spokesperson for United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was reported to have "stressed that the UN is against the death sentence and in this case, as in all others, it is calling for the verdict to be cancelled."
On 28 October 2010, it was reported that some Iraqi Bishops and many ordinary Iraqis also condemned the death penalty for Aziz. Furthermore, according to The Wall Street Journal, "several international human-rights groups have criticised the procedures and questioned the impartiality of the court." According to Agence France-Presse (AFP), his family stated that Aziz, along with 25 fellow inmates, had been on a hunger strike following the sentence to protest the denial of their once-monthly visits with family and friends, but an Iraqi court official has denied this. According to AFP, Aziz and the other prisoners were "still at the site of the court in Baghdad’s Green Zone and had not been transferred back to prison where they could have received their monthly visit." On 17 November 2010, it was reported that Iraqi President Jalal Talabani had declared that he would not sign Aziz's execution order. On 5 December 2011, Saad Yousif al-Muttalibi, an adviser to the Prime Minister, had claimed the execution of Aziz would "definitely take place" after the withdrawal of American forces.
Ziad Aziz now lives in Jordan with his wife, four children. Tariq Aziz's wife and another son live in Jordan.
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